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Napisano: 15 Okt 2010 10:37
На овом потфоруму више пута је указивано на важност смисла речи, као и вредност адекватног именовања ствари. Једна од речи која повезује духовну и сазнајно-чулну природу човека јесте алетеја. Одмах да кажем: Немојте се много ослањати на Википедију, бар не на ону "српску", пошто ћете за резултат добити истоимени астероид, а уз више труда и назив једне руске издавачке куће.
Као и све велике, многозначајне и свесадржајне речи, и алетеја означава укупност онога што је касније "издиференцирано" на више (наводно) јасно "омеђених" појмова. Алетеја подразумева истину, искреност, стварност, спознају, просветљење, отвореност, доступност, препознавање, сагласје ума и духа... И на овом месту скрећем пажњу на то да "изведене" појмове не треба схватати као појавне видове основног појма, већ да набрајање служи само како би се створио утисак целовитог значења, да - када изговорите "алетеја" - у тренутку помислите на све што је том речју именовано у својој укупности.
У свету философије, дело Мартина Хајдегера ближи нас изворном схватању овог појма, и увиђању нераскидиве везе мисли (промишљања) и уметности, а посебно између философије и поезије.
Енглеска Википедија има сасвим солидан чланак посвећен алетеји:
Citat:Aletheia (ἀλήθεια) is the Greek word for "truth", and like the English word implies sincerity as well as factuality or reality. The literal meaning of the word ἀ–λήθεια is, "the state of not being hidden; the state of being evident".
It is a significant concept in the study of philosophy and epistemology because defining truth as aletheia, instead of as correspondence or coherence, represents a clear departure from nearly every philosophical tradition since the Ancient period.[citation needed]
In the early to mid 20th-century, Martin Heidegger renewed attention in aletheia and developed the notion into the form recognized today; a renewed attempt to understand Truth. Heidegger gave an etymological analysis of the term, and drew out an understanding of aletheia as 'disclosedness'; cf. Lethe as forgetfulness.
Thus, aletheia is distinct from the more well-known conceptions of truth as statements which accurately describe a state of affairs (correspondence), or statements which fit properly into a system taken as a whole (coherence). Instead, Heidegger focused on the elucidation of a meaning of truth that is pre-Socratic.
Chiefly, then, aletheia is the truth that first appears when something is seen or revealed. It is to take out of hiddenness to uncover. It is not something that is connected with that which appears. Allowing something to appear is then the first act of truth; for example, one must give attention to something before it can be a candidate for any further understanding, for any understanding of space it must first somehow appear. Untruth, then, is something concealed or disguised.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aletheia
Онтолошка страна уметности заокупљала је Хајдегера, па не чуди танана духовна веза нашег философа са Хелдерлиновим стваралаштвом, као ни став да је лепота начин постојања истине, пошто истина у себи обухвата лепоту. Подразумевајући под истином нескривање (уз превођење речи "алетеја" као Unverborgenheit - "нескривеност"), Хајдегер је указивао и на то да укупност/целину није лако схватити, док је "тајном" називао скривање бивајућег, које подразумева и супротност истини, али и нужно условљава истину.
Интересантно је да Хајдегер у поезији види средиште, стицај свих уметности изражених кроз мисаони говор. Дакле, једино поезија/уметност може да открије суштину ствари, задржавајући исконски склад између откривања (откровења) и тајне. Прожимајуће осећање светости које човека обузме док чита узвишену поезију јесте стање у којем се нутрином сагледава тајна и њена неопходност, и у којем се човек ближи својим изворима. Формализована естетика то не може да досегне.
Остаје питање колико се Хајдегер приближио основном, изворном значењу речи "алетеја", и да ли је његов матерњи "тврди" језик уопште способан да то изрази, у светлу "бића", "битка", "бивања", "бивствовања", "бивајућег", "бивствујућег"...
Dopuna: 28 Dec 2010 9:35
Прилично детаљно и фактографски, о трагањима за смислом и значењем ове речи, од давних времена до данас, укључујући и све промене смисла и значења.
ALETHÉIA IN ANCIENT GREEK
"The study of early Greek notions of truth is still dominated, fifty years later, by Heidegger's influential restatement of the view that to a-lêthes is, originally and essentially, to mê lanthanon -- i.e., the "unhidden" or "unforgotten". If Heidegger and his followers are correct, alêtheia must be a quality inherent in objects perceived or information received: a certain self-evidence, abiding clarity or memorableness. Against this view (though also, by implication, against those who reject altogether the correctness or relevance of the derivation from the root lath- Bruno Snell has recently suggested that the lêthê excluded by a-lêtheia is something found in persons rather than things: forgetfulness rather than hiddenness or being forgotten. A-lethes is that which is retained in the memory without any of the gaps to which such lêthê would give rise.
In this "subjective" reformulation of the established, "objective" interpretation, aletheia becomes the result of the way an original apprehension remains in the perceiving subject's memory, not an aspect of objects or information as originally apprehended. But perception or apprehension continues to be of major, if no longer central, importance. The discussion which follows accepts Snell's subjective interpretation in the main but argues for further reformulation, this time in terms of the processes of communication rather than perception: alêtheia is that which is involved in, or results from, a 'transmission of information that excludes lêthê ', whether in the form of forgetfulness, failure to notice, or ignoring. The semantic development thus posited, by which a word that originally meant something like "conscientious reporting" became a synonym for truth (etymon or eteon in the earliest attested Greek) has a close parallel in the transformation of Latin accuratus ("careful", usually of speech or writing) into English "accurate". The Greek counterpart to this development is more complex and harder to trace: alêtheia absorbs some of the original meaning of two other more specialized terms (nêmertês, atrekês) and transmits some of its own to a third (akribês) before finally becoming, in the mid-fifth century, the most general and important word for truth. Moreover, the initial and terminal stages of its history are much better documented than the intervening ones. But the development in all its phases is worth an attempt at reconstruction, even if the consequences for the history of Greek thought are less spectacular here than where the Heideggerian etymology serves as a point of departure.
Snell's subjective reformulation, whether as originally presented by him or in the revised version to be offered here, removes the most 'crucial ' problem posed by its objective alternative. Hiddenness (or failure to be remembered) and its opposite are conditions which should attach to things as well as to the content of statements. Yet it is almost, exclusively to the latter that alêthes refers in its first two and a half centuries of attestation. A Greek may, from the very beginning, speak the truth (or "true things"), but it is not until much later that he is able to hear it (Aesch. Ag. 680), or see it (Pind. N. 7,25), or be truly good (Simonides 542,1 Page), or believe in true gods (Herodotus 2, 174, 2). And it is later still that alêtheia comes to refer to the external reality of which discourse and art are imitations. Other lanthanein derivatives — lathra, lathraios (and alastos, if it belongs to this group)—are applied freely, at all periods of their use, to persons, things and situations; why not alêthes as well? The question becomes fairly easy to answer if alêtheia is taken to be, in origin, a kind of "unforgettingness", a specifically human quality and one which is most crucially and consistently important in the realm of human discourse.
From: Thomas Cole - Archaic truth - Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica, Nuova Serie, 13, 1983, pp. 7-28.
SOME REMARKS ON THE ETYMOLOGY OF ALETHEIA
"Aletheia is the most important Greek counterpart of our 'truth'; alethes (true), alethos (truly) and alethein (to speak the truth) are related words. However, the Greek "truth-family" is much more comprehensive and consists of 14 words, among others (adjectives): atrekes, nemertes, adolos, ortos, apseudos, etymos and etetymos. It is characteristic that several words, including aletheia also, belonging to this variety begin with 'a'. The most common interpretation of this lexical phenomenon it to consider 'a' as a sign of privativum, that is, as a negative noun or adjective. This understanding of aletheia was proposed by Sextus Empiricus, Plutarch, Ohimpiodoros and the so-called Lexicon Gudianum in antiquity (see [Wilhelm Luther, "Wahrheit" und "Lüge" im ältesten Griechentum (1935), pp. 12-13; Paul Friedländer, Platon: Seinswaheheit und Lebenswrklichkeit, (1954) pp. 222, 375]). In our times, it was recalled by Leo Myers in his influential Handbuch der griechischen Etymologie (1901) and popularized by Rudolf Bultmann (see [Der griechische und hellenistische Sprachgebrauch von ἀλήθεια, p. 239]): "aletheia - etymologisch das Nicht(s) - verheimlichen - bedeutet". According to this interpretation, we should consider such words as complexes of the following structure: a-letheia, a-trekes, a-dolos or a-pseudos; nemertes can be understood in a similar way, because 'ne' functions as 'a', that is, as an indicator of a privative character. As far as the matter concerns aletheia, its etymology is derived as a + lethe + suffix. Aletheia as a noun occurred with so-called verba dicendi, [verbs of saying] that is, verbs like Greek counterparts of "to tell" or "to hear". So much about matters of lexicology and a simple grammar. Of course, semantic matters are much more important. Very schematically, if V(aletheia), where the letter V stands for a verbum dicendi, represents an aletheia-context, to V an aletheia consisted in issuing a concrete sentence in the present tense about something, usually supported by direct experience, particularly seeing (see [H. Boeder, Der frügeschichte Wörtgebrauch von Logos und Aletheia (1959) pp. 68-71]). Then, applications of aletheia-contexts were extended to past and future events. Finally, aletheia became an abstract noun, denoting a property of sentences (judgements, etc.)."
From: Jan Wolenski - Aletheia in Greek thought until Aristotle - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 127: 339-360 (2005)
A SYNTHETIC OVERVIEW OF ALETHÉIA IN ANCIENT GREEK
1. For many years there has been a tendency in biblical studies to over-generalize about the uses of alétheia and aléthes in classical Greek. This has been done partly with a view to drawing a clear-cut contrast between Greek and Hebraic concepts of truth. It is then argued that whilst some New Testament writers preserve the Hebraic concept, other writers, especially John, achieve a fusion of these two views. Thus R. Bultmann too readily speaks of "the Greek use" of alétheia as over against "the semitic use" (Theological Dictionary of the New Testament I 238-). According to this theory, alétheia in classical Greek denotes truth in contrast to mere appearance, whilst in Hebrew the parallel word denotes stability or faithfulness. It is also urged that truth in Greek writers is timeless, raised above the temporal and material world. It relates only to extra-historical being. Most scholars also insist that the basic meaning of alétheia in classical Greek is that of unhiddenness or unveiling. These traditional claims of nineteenth- and twentieth-century biblical scholarship are valid up to a point, but can be misleading unless they are carefully qualified.
2. The traditional approach depends largely on three arguments.
(a) Much is made of the etymology of alétheia in ancient Greek The word is said to derive from letho or lanthano , meaning to escape notice or to cause to forget, together with Alpha privative prefix, which negates the idea. The difficulty, however, is to show that the etymology of the word played a decisive part in determining its meaning in later Greek of the classical and Hellenistic periods. Indeed, even Homer shows little evidence that the word has this special nuance.
(b) alétheia does indeed mean truth in contrast to mere appearance in much Greek philosophy. But the vast majority of classical Greek writers and readers were not philosophers. J. B. Skemp observes, "There is one particular vice in the theological picture (or rather, caricature) of the Greeks. They are always represented as philosophical thinkers.... Such a description of the Greeks ignores the fact that many other Greeks at all the relevant times thought differently, and that a multitude of them did not think in this systematic way at all" (The Greeks and the Gospel , 1964, 3-4).
(c) The notion of truth as against mere appearance and as that which belongs only to the realm of timelessness and immateriality finds strong support in Parmenides and especially in Plato. This need not be denied. Nevertheless, even within Greek philosophy itself there are other views of truth besides Plato's, for example, that of the Sophists, which Plato himself attacks, and also that of Aristotle. In these writers truth has a more positive relation to the material world.
3. (a) In Homer alétheia is most frequently used in contrast to the telling of a lie or to the withholding of information, e.g. "Tell me all the truth [pasan alétheian] whether my son is by the ship" (Ilyad 24, 407); "I will tell you all the truth" (Odyssey 11, 507). When Odysseus with cunning "spoke not the truth", he simply tells a lie (Od. 13, 254). Achilles set an umpire to tell the truth of a race, i.e. the state of affairs as it really was (Il. 23, 361). However, this is not the only meaning of alétheia or alethes in Homer. In Il. 12, 433 gyne chernetis alethes means a woman who is careful, honest, accurate, or even perhaps reliable. (b) alétheia usually stands in opposition to falsehood in Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophanes. For example, the cowherd in Herodotus "tells the truth" under threat of violence (l, 116). Thucydides speaks of "the actual truth" in contrast to mere empty boasts (2, 41, 2). An oracle provides true answers to enquiries (Herodotus., l, 55). (c) This usage also persists in later Hellenistic writers. Thus Epictetus contrasts telling the truth with deceiving flatteries (Discourse IV, l, 6, 7). Philo writes that Moses marvelled at the delusion (pseudos) which the multitude had bartered for the truth (alétheia ) (De Vita Moses 2, 167). The evil spies sent out to view the land prefer deceit (apate) to truth (Vit. Mos. l, 235). Josephus uses alétheia in several different senses.
(i) Truth is that which corresponds to the facts of the matter. Thus Jonathan did not question the truth (veracity) of David's words (Antiquities of the Jews 6, 225).
(ii) Truth is also proved to be such by historical events. The words of a prophet are thus proved true (Antiquities 2, 209); whilst in the previous passage Jonathan does not wait to see David's words proved true (Antiquities 6, 225). (iii) Josephus also uses alethes in the sense of "genuine" or "real". Thus Ahab killed the real owner (ton alethe despoten) of the vineyard (Antiquities 8, 360).
4. The use of alethes in Greek philosophical texts is best seen in Parmenides, the Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle. Some of Plato's uses also appear in Philo.
(a) Parmenides asks what is the nature of real being, and draws a contrast between the way of truth and the way of seeming. Change belongs only to the material world, which is the realm of mere appearance. There can be no change in what really exists (Fragment 8, 29). "What is not" is unthinkable and unknowable, but change would be the supposed movement of what is to what is not, or of what is not to what is. Hence truth, in contrast to appearance, belongs to the extra-historical realm of the changeless. That such a view occurs in Greek philosophical literature is therefore clear. What is less certain is the extent to which ordinary Greek writers shared the view of Parmenides.
(b) The Sophists clearly held a different view. In particular Protagoras refused to view the material world as mere illusion. His famous dictum that "man is the measure of all things" was not intended merely, as Plato implied, as an extreme form of relativism. He cited the example of a wind which may seem warm to one person and cool to another. It is not necessary, he urged, to say that one view is true and the other false. Each may be true for the person concerned. In this way Protagoras comes near to the modern notion of existential truth.
(c) Plato rejects this view.
(i) He replied that if "true" and "false" are only relative to the individual thinker, then as soon as someone says that the philosophy of Protagoras is false for him, it is therefore false (Theaetetus 171 a). Falsehood, for Plato, is a matter of deception. It conceals reality (ta onta). False words, he believed, are merely a copy (mimem) of deception in the soul (Republic 2, 21, 382a-383b). Falsehood is the presentation of what is only appearance (phantasma). By contrast "the divine and the divinity are free from falsehood [apseudes ... to theion]". God is true in deed and word (alethes en to ergo kai en logo) and neither changes himself nor deceives others (382e). Plato thus returns to the view, earlier outlined in Parmenides, that truth stands in contrast to appearance and to change, although he goes further than Parmenides in locating it in the realm of eternal ideas.
(ii) At the same time Plato also uses alétheia and alethes in more ordinary and less metaphysical ways. Truth sometimes means simply "the facts of the matter" (Epistles 7, 330). alétheia stands in contrast to legend (Timaeus 22d). "Equal to equal ... because of truth" (Legibus 2, 668a).
(d) Aristotle takes us closest to the view of truth found in modern propositional logic. Firstly, Aristotle distinguishes between the genuine proposition, which is true-or-false, and sentences such as pleas or commands. "We call propositions only those (sentences) which have truth or falsity in them" (On Interpretation 4, 17a, 4). Secondly, he considers the logical conditions under which the truth of a proposition entails the denial of its contrary. If it is true to say "Socrates is well", it is therefore false to say "Socrates is ill" (Categories 10, 13b, 14-35). Thirdly, he argues that "the truth of a proposition consists in corresponding with facts" (hoi logoi aletheis hosper ta pragmata, On Interpretation 9, 19a, 33). The principle is said to include statements about future states of affairs (18a-b). Often, however, the actual word alétheia is used in its ordinary everyday sense without philosophical content. The philosopher seeks to discover "the truth" that is in the universe (De Mundo 4, 39la).
(e) Philo uses alétheia in ordinary ways, as we have seen. As a Jewish theologian he speaks of "true doctrine" (alethes dogma, Legum Allegoriae 3, 229). But as a speculative writer who has been influenced by Platonism he also contrasts truth with mere appearance: "Moses desired truth rather than appearance [tou dokein]" (De Vita Moses 1, 4 . However, he also sees the truth of God manifested in historical events, as in a quick punishment for unbelief (Vit. Mos. 2, 284).” pp. 874-877
From: Anthony C. Thiselton - Truth. In The New international dictionary of New Testament theology. Vol. III. Edited by Brown Colin. Exeter: Paternoster Press 1978. pp. 874-902
http://www.ontology.co/aletheia.htm
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